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Abstract
This article investigates the variegated urbanization of technology-based economies through the
lenses of a comparative analysis looking at New York City and Rio de Janeiro. Over the last
decade, the former has gained a reputation as a ‘model tech city’ at the global level, while the
latter is an example of emerging ‘start-up city’. Using a Marxist-Foucauldian approach, the article
argues that, while technopoles in the 1980s and the 1990s arose from the late Keynesian state, the
globally hegemonic phenomenon of start-up urbanism is illustrative of an increasingly
decentralized neoliberal project of self-governing ‘enterprise society’, mobilizing ideas of
community, cooperation and horizontality within a context of cognitive-communicative
capitalism in which urban environments acquire renewed centrality. In doing so, the article
underlines start-up urbanism’s key contribution to the reinvention of the culture of global
capitalism in times of perceived economic shrinkage worldwide and the central role played by
major metropolitan centres in this respect.
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Introduction
In a context of advanced, increasingly multicentric globalization, cities are key to the cyclical
evolution of capitalist economies, understood as inherently unstable economic systems
(Sheppard, 2011): cities are often behind economic downturns and recessions, due to the
volatility of their overheated real estate markets but also as spaces condensing the wider
contradictions of capitalism; at the same time, they are crucial to processes of economic
recovery and renaissance in which the logic of capital accumulation is constantly reinvented
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(Rossi, 2017). The last 10 years have particularly illuminated this duplicity. In the aftermath
of the global economic crisis, characterized by a new wave of austerity urbanism (Peck, 2012)
and generalized fears about a ‘secular stagnation’ (Summers, 2014), at the public policy level
there has been an explosion of interest in the growth potential of contemporary cities,
especially in relation to the advent of socially interactive digital technologies. In the post-
recession years, cities and particularly their central areas in the United States and other
capitalist economies have indeed emerged as incubator spaces for the phenomenon of
technological start-up companies that has rapidly spread across the globalized world. In a
recent report documenting the rise of the so-called ‘start-up cities’ in the United States,
Richard Florida has emphasized how high-tech start-up businesses are spatially
concentrated within inner-city districts, rather than in suburban areas, thus challenging
the Silicon Valley model or, at least, offering an alternative to its spatial and socio-
economic pattern (Florida, 2014). In a subsequent report, this author has expanded his
view on the phenomenon, arguing that venture capital increasingly flows into top global
cities in both the North and the South of the world (Florida, 2016). Richard Florida and
other mainstream urban and regional economists contend that technology-oriented cities
and metropolitan areas have become engines of capitalist recovery and innovation in the
United States as well as in the emerging economies of the globalized world (Florida, 2012;
Glaeser, 2011; Moretti, 2012).
The worldwide eruption of the start-up phenomenon sheds light on a renewed ‘urban
centrality’ within contemporary technology-driven capitalism. Cities are no longer acting
only as nodes of stretched value chains specializing in advanced producer services, as the first
generation of global city scholarship particularly evidenced, but also as privileged sites for
technology-intensive interactive economies. Complex ecosystems involving a wide array of
actors, institutions and relational networks have taken shape at the urban level in this
context. The news media have enthusiastically embraced technology-based start-up
urbanism as a new promised land of socio-economic prosperity. Start-up urbanism is
customarily represented as a new ‘happiness industry’, an emotional machine reviving
capitalism’s promise of happiness in a general context of economic shrinkage (Ahmed,
2010; Davies, 2015; Florida et al., 2013). For instance, The Economist has dedicated a
special report to the start-up phenomenon emphatically entitled ‘A Cambrian moment’,
whose introduction stresses the intimately urban dimension of high-tech start-up companies:
Start-ups are a big part of a new movement back to the city. Young people increasingly turn
away from suburbia and move to hip urban districts, which become breeding grounds for new
firms. Even Silicon Valley’s centre of gravity is no longer along Highway 101 but in San
Francisco south of Market Street. (The Economist, 2014: 2)
Think tanks and foundations, drawing on knowledge and expertise provided by urban
development gurus (academics like Richard Florida plus a plethora of ‘global
consultants’), the vast majority based in North America, have played a central role in this
process of discourse production and dissemination, exerting strong influence over the public
policy sphere. The resulting process of policy mobility (McCann and Ward, 2011; Peck and
Theodore, 2015) has globalized the pursuit of start-up urbanism. High-tech entrepreneurial
communities from all across the world portray their urban environments as ‘start-up cities’,
using closely related jargon and discourse. At the same time, digital technologies have
enabled the circulation of this emerging culture of tech-driven capitalism beyond the role
of established intermediaries acting as ‘agents of persuasion’ (Peck, 2002). The advent of a
global start-up city has therefore become a largely decentralized discourse, despite its roots
being originally associated with the US economy and society.
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This article looks at two examples of start-up urbanism: New York City and Rio de
Janeiro. The former has acquired a reputation as a ‘model tech city’ at the global level;
the latter offers an example of emerging ‘start-up city’, where the entrepreneurial state plays
a decisive role in creating a self-propulsive start-up economy. The article compares these
emerging trajectories of start-up urbanism to previous policy experiments aimed at creating
technopoles in different geographical contexts in the 1980s and the 1990s. In doing so, it
argues that, while technolopoles revealed a logic of policy-driven regional economic
development emanating from the entrepreneurialist ‘late Keynesian state’, start-up
urbanism is associated with a neoliberal governmental rationality aiming at creating
conditions for a self-governing ‘enterprise society’ (Lazzarato, 2009) whose ultimate goal
is the pursuit of the ‘entrepreneur of the self’ (Gordon, 1991). Being an urban tech
entrepreneur entails adopting an ‘integral form-of-life’, based on a combination of
emotions, habits and modes of relationality, rather than simply embarking on an
entrepreneurial project. According to Michel Foucault, the ‘entrepreneur of the self’ is a
pillar of the biopolitical project of societal government in advanced liberal societies:
The stake in all neoliberal analyses is the replacement every time of homo oeconomicus as
partner of exchange with a homo oeconomicus as entrepreneur of himself, being for himself
his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings.
(Foucault, 2008: 229)
In the current politico-economic context, the city is seen as an ‘ecosystem’, comprising
knowledge, creativity and a variety of communities of practice, enabling the individual to
become an ‘entrepreneur of himself’. This ecosystem provides what we defined here as the
‘cognitive-communicative capital’ of cities. Urban politico-economic elites mobilize for the
valorization of this capital, as the two trajectories of start-up urbanism being investigated
here demonstrate in different ways, as we will see.
The article is structured as follows: in the first section, we introduce readers to the notion
of cognitive-communicative capital, drawing mainly on the work of Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri, who have highlighted the affirmative dimension of biopolitical capitalism,
and on that of Jodi Dean, who has analysed the communicative politics of late liberal
societies after the advent of the Internet 2.0. In the second section, the article articulates
the notion of ‘global start-up urbanism’, showing how this notion challenges previous
understandings of technopoles and informational cities. The third section presents our
comparative research on New York and Rio de Janeiro. The article concludes with a
discussion of the case studies and a more general reflection on the contribution this
research has to offer to contemporary debates over global urbanization and urbanism.
The cognitive-communicative capital of cities
In Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri started conceptualizing in a Marxist vein the
contemporary informatization of production as a shift from the formal subsumption of
labour under capital prevailing in industrial capitalism to the ‘real subsumption’ of
society and life itself, which entails the capitalist valorization of knowledge, affects,
communicational and relational abilities: what Marx called ‘the general intellect’ in his
visionary ‘fragment on machines’ text (Hardt and Negri, 2000). In their subsequent
Commonwealth (the third book of their trilogy on capitalism and globalization), Hardt
and Negri have identified the metropolis as the privileged site of biopolitical production
in contemporary societies, as it generates forms of life that add value to knowledge-intensive
capitalism (Hardt and Negri, 2009). In doing so, they have offered a neo-Foucauldian
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affirmative understanding of biopolitics as politics of life rather than merely as politics over
life (Campbell, 2008). In discussing the role played by urban environments in contemporary
capitalist societies, Hardt and Negri emphasize the extractive nature of what economists
conventionally define ‘externalities’: contemporary knowledge-based capitalism draws on
social cooperation taking place outside its sphere. Apologists of technology-based start-up
economies like Richard Florida and The Economist emphasize the idea that ‘place matters’ in
contemporary global societies, particularly the environments of culturally thriving urban
societies. In a Marxist-Foucauldian vein (see also Negri, 2016), Hardt and Negri
underline the role played by urban environments as unique condensations of socio-
affective relations and socially diffused knowledge which stand outside the capitalist
process and are subsequently appropriated and incorporated within the capitalist circuit
of valorization. Their perspective provides us with an explanation of the cities’ central
role within processes of economic recovery after the Great Recession of 2008–9, as
politico-economic elites across the planet are increasingly investing in technology-based
economies in large metropolitan centres: ‘The metropolis is the site of biopolitical
production because it is the space of the common, of people living together, sharing
resources, communicating, exchanging goods and ideas’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 250).
What ‘the metropolis’ provides to capitalist economies is indeed not only a dense
environment in terms of knowledge, social relations and a wide range of interactional
opportunities, but also an imaginary of excitement and social enlivenment enabled by the
communicative channels offered by digital technologies. The ‘language power’ offered by
digital technologies paves the way for the rise of a sense of ‘us’ (Virno, 2015), which gives the
illusion of getting rid of the individualism of neoliberal societies, idealizing the experience of
community as a discursive artefact (Joseph, 2002). The notion of communicative capitalism,
due to Jodi Dean (Dean, 2009), helps us highlight the ways in which this process actually
takes place. In Dean’s view, contemporary capitalist societies rely on intensified ‘networked
communications’ that ‘are celebrated for enabling everyone to contribute, participate, and be
heard’ (Dean, 2009: 30). As our analysis will show, this communicative dimension is
particularly strong in the urban phenomenon of start-up economies and communities,
through both on-line networks and live meetings. Analysing the contradictions of
contemporary democracy, Dean contends that communicative capitalism is a politico-
economic formation nurtured by a series of ‘animating fantasies’, most notably
‘abundance, participation, and wholeness’: firstly, the fantasy of abundance relates to the
idea that communication is not intended to produce an understanding per se (as in
Habermas’ theory of communicative action), but to contribute to the potentially
unlimited circulation of information and opinion, even though this fantasy occults the
devaluation of each specific contribution; secondly, the fantasy of participation stems
from the conviction that thanks to information technologies available to everyone our
actions online are politically significant; finally, the Internet materializes fantasies of unity
and wholeness as this space embodies the global. The rise of start-up discourse is premised
on this model of communicative capitalism, as it builds on the idea that the abundance of
investment opportunities in the high-tech sector allows everyone to launch a startup,
especially if this entrepreneurial endeavour becomes part of the city’s business ecosystem.
These ‘animating fantasies’ are in varying degrees nurtured by the emphasis placed on self-
organization, horizontality and community within the start-up scene, but also by politico-
economic strategies devised by local and national leaders, as we will see in the empirical
sections of this article.
The dominant neoliberal governmental rationality looks at what we can define ‘cognitive-
communicative capitalism’ as a strategic terrain for realizing its ideal of a self-governing
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‘enterprise society’ through an entrepreneurialization of the self. This explains why the idea
of start-up economies has become so popular within current public debates, notably
amongst urban policy makers and city mayors.
From first-generation high tech urbanization to global
start-up urbanism
The eruption of the global discourse around the rise of so-called start-up cities is a recent
phenomenon, which however has significant antecedents in the early stages of the
globalization era. The idea of associating high-tech companies with cities and regions
traces its origins back to the late 1980s and the 1990s with the phenomenon known as the
‘Siliconization’ of urban and regional economies across the world, particularly within the
context of the rise of the so-called ‘informational cities’ and ‘technopoles’ (Bunnell, 2002;
Castells, 1989; Castells and Hall, 1994).
At that time, East Asia was fertile ground for the adoption of a model of urban and
regional economic development inspired by the Californian Silicon Valley: the ‘multi-media
supercorridor’ created in Cyberjaya in Malaysia and the techno-pole of Zhongguancun near
Beijing in China are examples of state-led strategies aimed at reproducing the Silicon Valley
model in the Asian context (Zhou, 2008). Singapore is another key reference: since the early
1990s its government adopted a branding policy presenting Singapore as an ambitious
‘intelligent city’, creating conditions for the development of clusters of globally
competitive tech industries in different domains, from information technology to the
biomedical sector (Arun and Yap, 2000). In these and other Asian experiences, a central
role has been played by the ‘developmental state’. The visible hand of state and local
authorities, however, was not confined to the newly industrializing countries of East Asia.
State interventionism was a distinguishing feature of technopoles in the most industrialized
economies, such as in the case of the technology park of Sophia Antipolis in France and the
technopolis programme in Japan (Castells and Hall, 1994). Other prominent examples of
attempted ‘clonization’ of the Silicon Valley were Tel Aviv in Israel, Helsinki in Finland,
Cambridge in the United Kingdom, Bangalore in India and the so-called digital island of
Ireland, amongst others (Roper and Grimes, 2005; Rosenberg, 2002). These experiments
were intended to reproduce the paradigmatic example of the Sun Belt in which the
Keynesian entrepreneurial state was at the forefront of the industrialization strategy
which led to the formation of high-tech clusters like the Research Triangle in North
Carolina, the Orange County, the Silicon Valley (Mazzuccato, 2013). In the 1960s and the
1970s, following in the wake of the social welfare programmes pursued within the framework
of Roosvelt’s New Deal from the 1930s onwards, the wider US South witnessed intense
economic growth particularly thanks to Federal defence programmes, which helped to
establish the region as national leader in aerospace, electronics, and ‘business climate’
(Schulman, 1991). The ‘entrepreneurial state’, therefore, played a key role in the rise of
what is customarily known the post-Fordist Sunbelt, bringing together a Schumpeterian
emphasis on technological innovation as a motor of economic growth with a demand-
driven, Keynesian approach to economic development (Eisinger, 1988).
The economic crisis at the start of the new century and subsequent technological changes
led to the end of the Siliconization era as it became known in the 1990s. This first
Siliconization era saw the emergence of a select circle of urban and regional spaces
attracting newly formed firms and venture capital in the high-tech sector, in which a
specific spatial structure of production and a related symbolism took shape (Massey et al.,
1992). Three were the distinctive characteristics of these economic spaces. Firstly, the
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majority of high-tech projects were characterized by a model of innovation focused on the
threefold university–industry–government interaction. In this context, the process of
technological innovation relies on spatially contained processes of knowledge spillover,
networking and institutionalization, as in the cases of technology clusters, science parks
and university incubators. Secondly, in spatial terms, even though a limited set of
powerful metropolitan areas such as Tokyo, Paris and London with economically and
socially ‘innovative milieux’ already witnessed endogenous dynamics of technology-led
economic development (Castells and Hall, 1994), private and public investment and
related ‘high-tech fantasies’ remained focused on a small number of college towns,
suburban areas and semi-rural environments. The adoption of such a hierarchical and
spatially selective innovation model led to leave off the map both conventional
manufacturing spaces and the vast majority of inner-city areas (Massey et al., 1992).
Thirdly, even though economic-political conditions substantially differed from one place
to another across the globe, informational cities, technopoles, science parks and other
experiments inspired by the Silicon Valley model were generally ‘planned developments
[. . .] resulted from various kinds of cooperation or partnership between the public and
private sectors [. . .] promoted by central or regional or local governments, often in
association with universities’ (Castells and Hall, 1994: 1). In conclusion, the first wave of
global high-tech urbanization – albeit differentiated in its outcomes and institutional forms
and dynamics – was an example of what we could define the ‘late Keynesian era’, whose
main features were the following: an innovation process confined to the university–industry–
government interaction; a highly selective locational logic; a normative role of public policy.
In the late 1990s, an early – and ephemeral – manifestation of the post-Keynesian era was
the phenomenon of the first generation of Internet-based companies, at that time known as
‘new media industries’, which particularly developed within inner-city areas through
endogenous dynamics. However, the bust of the so-called ‘dot com bubble’ in 1999–2000
led to a quick unravelling of this phenomenon. A second, and still decisive, turning point
occurred a few years later, in the mid-2000s. The truly groundbreaking changes occurred in
the mid-2000s within the Internet with the creation of online social media (such as Facebook,
Youtube, Twitter, Linkedin and other more specialized professional networks), along with
the invention of new forms of community-making such as the meetups, have radically
transformed the landscape and the experience itself of high-tech entrepreneurship and the
related associational economies. Online and live meetings and events (variously known as
high-tech meetups, ‘startup weeekends’, startup cups, and the like) dedicated to the high-tech
business scene have proliferated in an ever-growing number of cities and towns across the
globe. These actors – private or non-profit – are inspired by the principle of ‘self-
organization’, whose aim is to create ‘an ideal city where bottom-up cooperation coalesces
into an ingenious and complex social organization’ (Uitermark, 2016).
In aspiring or established high-tech cities, this ‘ideal city’ is customarily defined by startup
communities and the organizations gravitating around them in terms of ‘ecosystem’.
Ecosystem is the key term in the lexicon of the start-up movement across the world. The
notion of ‘business ecosystem’ was theorized and popularized for the first time by James
Moore (1993), a visionary business consultant, in an article published in the Harvard
Business Review, in which he took from Gregory Bateson, the renowned anthropologist
and biologist, the idea of co-evolution to highlight the fact that innovative industrial firms
do not evolve in a vacuum but create cooperative networks in order to attract capital,
resources, partners, suppliers and customers. Start-up leaders and ordinary members
customarily portray themselves as complex ecosystems pursuing the ideal of high-tech
communities through a wide range of live and online networks, organizations and events,
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while high-tech corporations are seen as participants rather than dominators within the local
ecosystem. In this sense, on-line communication tools have made the difference in the move
towards self-organization and autonomy and the valorization of urban environments as
interactional contexts.
Similarities, but also substantial differences can be found between start-up urban
economies and the associational economy patterns epitomized by the regional innovation
systems investigated within regional development scholarship in the late 1990s and the 2000s.
Even though the latter specialize in more traditional manufacturing sectors, as in the
paradigmatic Italian industrial district model, both business systems are based on small
and medium-sized firms. In an influential book, Philip Cooke and Kevin Morgan
observed that the ‘associational repertoire’ they were scrutinizing was intended ‘to
empower intermediate associations which lie between state and market, be they groups of
firms, trade associations, chambers of commerce, labour unions, or civic associations’
(Cooke and Morgan, 1999: 22). Start-up communities revive the associational economy
paradigm. However, a heightened sense of globalization appears to be the distinguishing
trait of contemporary start-up communities. While firms and regional organizations giving
rise to associational economies shared a place-based sense of belonging, start-up
communities perceive themselves as nodes in globally stretched networks across the
planet. High-tech entrepreneurs see the local interactional context as a relevant arena, but
this participation in the local scene is nurtured by a sense of allegiance to the global start-up
community. The urban high-tech scene, therefore, cannot be conceived without reference to
the global context. On the other hand, the vast majority of start-up communities form and
take shape as a way to emulate successful examples of start-up cities, such as New York, as
we shall see, Austin, San Francisco, in the United States, and Berlin and London in Western
Europe. This imitation process clearly emanates from the economic-cultural context of
globalization understood as a discursive formation. Moreover, organizations promoting
periodical events and happenings such as the Startup Weekends portray themselves as
global in nature, willing to establish links with local organizations. Put it briefly, for high-
tech start-up communities globalization is no longer synonym only for international markets
and transnational production chains, as was and still is for firms in more conventional
production systems and sectors, but is a fluid space of belonging devoted to the
circulation of ideas, events, networks and the production of knowledge flows.
Comparing trajectories of start-up urbanism
The previous section of this article has identified the three following characteristics of
contemporary start-up urban economies: firstly, unlike numerous projects of tech-driven
urban and regional development in the late 1980s and 1990s, these economic-spatial
entities are not directly planned by state and local authorities, but local governments
actively support them, contributing to a governmental rationality closely aligned with
the constitution of knowledge-based capitalism; secondly, they are built upon
imaginaries, discourses, and fantasies of business ecosystems comprising a variety of
mutually interacting public and private actors, inspired by principles of self-
organization, cooperation and autonomy; thirdly, they differ from previous experiences
of associational economy in that the primary sense of belonging that unites start-up
businesses comes from their embeddedness in global networks and flows of ideas,
discourse, knowledge, technical expertise, rather than only in place-based intermediary
institutions, as was the case for the small and medium-sized firms analysed by regional
development scholars in the 1990s.
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In what follows, we will provide illustrative evidence of two urban contexts in which
technology-based start-up economies have been at the centre of public discourse around
economic development in recent times. This comparative analysis will show how the
propagation of a neoliberal governmentality dictating the entrepreneurialization of society
is essential to knowledge-based capitalism. In particular through the illustrative cases of New
York and Rio de Janeiro, we show how local politico-economic elites have become
increasingly aware of the crucial role that urban environments play in technology-
intensive global capitalism. The trajectories of start-up urbanism analysed here offer
evidence of a variegated process of global urbanization of technology-based economies. In
comparing the trajectories of start-up urbanism in New York and Rio de Janeiro, we rely on
qualitative sources of information, in addition to direct observation through fieldwork
(conducted in February–March 2015 in New York and in April 2015 in Rio) and the use
of official documentation.
Our comparative analysis of New York and Rio de Janeiro is based on a multi-method
qualitative approach, combining interviews and media content analysis. We believe that the
methodological pluralism of critical urban studies (Ward, 2014) is well suited to the
investigation of variegated forms of global urbanization, as those being analysed here. In
the New York’s case study, we draw on 10 in-depth interviews conducted with qualified
informants involved in the local business ecosystem, such as consultants, experts, tech
community leaders and journalists (see Sources). Our intent here has been to hear directly
from local informants in order to investigate the differences between today’s ‘start-up
urbanism’ and the previous ‘dot com’ economy in the late 1990s, showing the way in which
the idea of New York as a ‘model tech city’ at the global level has gained ground. The case of
Rio de Janeiro is based on a detailed analysis of three major news media outlets in Brazil from
2010 to 2015: O’Globo, a generalist, neoliberal-oriented newspaper voicing the interests of the
right-wing parties; the fortnightly Exame, a business magazine that speaks to the country’s
economic elites; Valor Econoˆmico, a leading financial outlet in Brazil oscillating between the
neoliberal parties and the developmentalist forces coalesced around the Workers’ Party that
governed from 2003 to August 2016. Here the intent is to look at the rise of the startup-city
narrative within the public sphere in its early stages: the federal government and the
mainstream press have largely converged in the pursuit of a knowledge-based form of
capitalism exploiting the cognitive-communicative capital of Brazilian urban society,
including that of its most deprived areas, the ‘favelas’, leaving aside the ideological divisions
and political tensions that have characterized this country in recent years.
New York: A model tech-city
New York City is an example of a metropolitan area that in the space of two decades has
rebuilt its reputation as a hub for technological innovation and economic resurgence, after
years of structural decline. This process of urban technological renaissance has gone so far
that New York’s high-tech community and its politico-economic elites believe the city has
become a role model for aspiring tech-cities across the world. Until two decades ago, only
few experts would have predicted this scenario. In their book on the ‘technopoles of the
world’, published in 1994, Manuel Castells and Peter Hall opposed the decline of New York
City in the technology sector to the ascendancy of Los Angeles and the larger Southern
California as the nation’s leading metropolitan milieu in this domain:
Until World War Two, and indeed for a few years after that, indeed much later, the metropolitan
innovative milieu appeared to be concentrated where it had long been, in the corridor or axis
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that led from Boston to Philadelphia, but was particularly concentrated in and around New
York City. This area – the crucible of the American electrical revolution of the 1870s and 1880s –
still seemed, as late as 1950, to exercise a continuing dominance over the emerging field of
electronics [. . .]. If anyone had cared to predict the venue for the forthcoming marriage of
space travel and electronics, surely it would have been somewhere in this corridor that joined
New York, the Bell Laboratories at Murray Hill, New Jersey, and nearby Princeton University.
Yet somehow, the Northeast Corridor lost this established lead. (Castells and Hall, 1994: 191)
In the 1960s, the 1970s and partially still in the 1980s, New York City particularly suffered
from urban decline as a consequence of the general crisis of Fordism, which affected also
technology-based manufacturing firms. Having gained a reputation as an ‘ungovernable city’
since the 1960s, the city’s declining trajectory culminated with the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s
which seriously threatened the stability and legitimacy of the city government. However, since
the 1980s, local politico-economic elites started pursuing a strategy inspired by neoliberal ideas
aimed at rebranding New York’s image as a market-friendly city (Greenberg, 2008). The
neoliberal turn in local politics coincided with the expansion of the financial district, mainly
as a consequence of the increasing financialization of the world economy, the strengthening of
producer services linked to multinational corporations, as well as the revitalization of the real
estate sector. Altogether, these factors contributed to rapidly turning New York into one of
the leading global cities across the world, but also into a paradigmatic example of socially
exclusionary urbanism (Zukin, 2009). The advent of a technology-based urban economy has
played a decisive role in the city’s physical and societal transformation. The process of Fordist
deindustrialization liberated space for new production activities in several areas of the inner
city, particularly in the boroughs of Manhattan and Brooklyn. With the founding of the
Internet in the early 1990s, a new generation of so-called ‘techno-bohemians’ emerged,
giving rise to a new media district that became known as ‘Silicon Alley’ (Indergaard, 2004).
The Flatiron District in mid-town Manhattan and the fast-gentrifying areas of Dumbo and
Williambsurg became the strongholds for the new media industries and the other ventures that
saw information and communication technologies as a new source for wealth accumulation and
the re-creation of the city’s ‘creative field’ (Scott, 2010).
The bust of the dot com bubble in 1999–2000, however, led to the unravelling of this first
generation of technology companies in New York City and elsewhere in the Western world.
This economic downturn was followed by the turmoil provoked by the 11 September attacks
on the World Trade Centre. However, only a few years later, between 2003 and 2006 a new
tech boom began: in the space of five years, from 2007 to 2012, over 1000 tech start-ups were
created (Centre for an Urban Future, 2012). Within a decade or so, New York would have
become the second U.S. tech hub in terms of venture capital attraction, after the San
Francisco Bay area and ahead of Boston, previously considered the main rival of the
Silicon Valley (Florida and Mellander, 2014). A report commissioned by the Partnership
for New York City, an organization representing corporate, investment and entrepreneurial
firms in the Big Apple, claims that New York today stands as a model city for cities in the
technology sector, even better than the Silicon Valley:
Silicon Valley may seem like an attractive template for creating urban tech sectors, but it is
unlikely that cities will be able to replicate it. Silicon Valley commercialized the fundamental
technologies of the last half century [. . .]. Cities don’t have 50 years to create a tech sector or the
revolutionary technologies underpinning the Valley’s rise [. . .]. New York City’s tech sector is a
much better role model for other cities. The city’s tech sector has emerged in just two decades,
with many of its new companies using existing infrastructure and industries like advertising,
media and fashion as platforms for growth. (Endeavour, 2014: 4)
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According to this report, the key factors in economic-institutional terms behind this success
are the dense and multifaceted networks developed by New York’s entrepreneurial and angel
investment communities. A vibrant community of high-tech entrepreneurs has played a key
role in this success story, forming the allegedly largest meetup community in the world
(around 40,000 members). New York Tech Meetup (NYTM) was created as an informal
social gathering in 2004, at a time in which the first generation of ‘new media industries’ had
almost disappeared and the new high-tech scene was just starting to take form. Six years
later, in 2010, the meetup became a formal, non-profit organization, organizing a major
‘demo event’ on a monthly basis. Jessica Lawrence, the executive director of NYTM when
this research was conducted in Winter 2015, emphasizes the role of social media and live
meetings within this community-based phenomenon:
It was initially a community reaction to the terrorist attacks. The Internet favoured the fact of
feeling connected. NY makes feeling being impersonal. NY was always the underdog in the tech
industry and was not taken seriously by investors and the large public. NYers therefore proudly
embraced the challenge of building a NY tech industry, which had to be something different
from what used to be known as Silicon Alley. This definition is still used but it’s more
reminiscent of the past. We have kept a sense of grassroots organization; the principles
guiding our action are: connect, educate, amplify, collaborate, advocate, inspire. (Interview
with the authors, February 2015)
Along with these major events organized by NY Tech Meetup, there are several other
meetings and networking events being promoted at both the neighbourhood and citywide
levels, such as the lively Silicon Harlem meetup, a recent social venture based in the Harlem
Centre of Renaissance, as well as minor events organized by technology training schools
(such as the Flatiron School), designers (such as Design Driven NY) and other ‘communities
of practice’.
Since the end of 2014, several events are also organized within the framework of the
Digital NYC initiative embraced by mayor Bill de Blasio, a partnership established with
public organizations such as the New York City Economic Development Corporation (a city
agency) and private corporations like IBM and Gust, the global platform of venture
capitalists led by the founder of New York Angels, a NY-based investment group that
has played a pioneering role in the NY tech scene (see Rose, 2014). However, some
informants have dismissed the Digital NY initiative as nothing more than a ‘great web
portal’, as a local journalist writing about technology issues related to New York City
contends, because ‘talk is cheap and politicians know that it’s risky to invest public
money in this sector’ (interview with the authors, February 2015). This ingrained
skepticism about the role of government reflects the conventional wisdom that ‘policy
initiatives have been marginally important’ in the rise of New York’s tech economy, as
Steven Malanga – a scholar affiliated with the neoliberal Manhattan Institute, who has
written about New York’s ‘Silicon Alley’ and its resurgence (Malanga, 2000, 2006) – puts
it (interview with the authors, February 2015). He rather emphasizes the positive role played
by pro-business political leaders such as mayor Rudolph Giuliani and governor George
Pataki in the second half of the 1990s, who enticed real estate developers willing to invest
in the high tech sector at a time in which the building vacancy rate in downtown New York
was exceptionally high (around the 25%). It was in this context that Bill Rudin – the
descendant of a real estate dynasty in New York – created the New York Information
Technology Center (NYITC), offering office space to technology firms, thereby providing
a decisive contribution to transforming a decaying Lower Manhattan into a ‘Mecca of the
high-tech’, as the official website puts it (www.55broadst.com). Even though the NYITC
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building is now in the process of being reconverted into mixed use, Rudin is still active on the
‘tech industry’ front, particularly through the Association for a Better New York founded by
his father in the 1970s, of which he is currently the chairman.
These observers, therefore, downplay the role played by local governments in spurring
technology-based urban economies, drawing on their experience of the first generation of
Internet-based media industries in the late 1990s. In the 2000s, however, with the second
wave of high-tech entrepreneurship, local leaders have become cognizant of the centrality of
cities, not just in terms of real-estate values but also in terms of socially diffused cognitive-
communicative capital, thus adopting a more proactive strategy compared with their
predecessors. Mayor Bloomberg has launched a number of ambitious megaprojects, most
notably the construction of the Cornell Tech school in the Roosvelt Island (a graduate
institute combining technology and creative thinking). The new progressive mayor Bill de
Blasio has associated his image with more socially-oriented initiatives, such as meetings and
forums organized in peripheral districts within the framework of the already mentioned
Digital NY web portal project, and the Tech Talent Pipeline designed to strengthen the
city’s tech workforce, which is part of a Federal initiative called Tech Hire, launched by
President Obama in early 2015. At the state level, governor Andrew Cuomo has put forward
the ‘Start-Up NY’ programme, in partnership with state universities, creating tax-free zones
for start-up firms within university properties, a policy that has raised widespread criticism
on both the right and the left due to the small number of jobs created and the
disproportionately high costs incurred (Sinquefield, 2015).
For their part, the main protagonists of the high-tech scene offer a minimalist
understanding of the role of public policy, being more inclined to emphasize processes of
cooperation, bottom-up mobilization and horizontality. In a recent report released in
collaboration with Bill Rudin’s Association for a Better New York and supported by
Google (headquartered in Chelsea, Manhattan, an area with high concentration of
creative industries), the NY Tech Meetup lays emphasis on the comparative advantage
offered by New York’s ‘economic ecosystem’, which comprises a variety of highly
competitive sectors such as fashion, advertising, government, retail, arts and culture, all
transversally touched by the technology sector (HR&A, 2014). In emphasizing the
centrality of the ‘ecosystem’, this report is illustrative of the pro-growth partnership
involving the start-up community, influential local developers and high-tech corporate
giants. In this perspective, Bloomberg’s idea that a major challenge for New York is to
prevail over London as the prominent urban tech centre in the world (Scott, 2013) remains
influential within the high-tech community, which has adopted the imperative of New York
as a model tech-city at the global level. The attraction of global high-tech corporations, such
as Google which arrived in New York City in 2006 expanding its offices in 2010 with the
acquisition of the giant building in Chelsea (and is expected to expand further in the coming
years) and Facebook which arrived in 2014 opening a stylish office in Greenwich Village, is
behind this growing emphasis on global competitiveness in the last five years, while at the
time of ‘Silicon Alley’ in the late 1990s there was no such a strategy as the so-called ‘new
media industries’ mainly attracted the interest of developers seeking to revamp the local
real estate.
These global ambitions are also the result of intentional governmental efforts, particularly
during the Bloomberg era. More generally, despite views negating or downplaying the role of
public policy, local government authorities importantly contribute to the pursuit of a society
constructed on the idea of the ‘entrepreneur of the self’, even though this occurs in
minimalist ways, in line with the ‘thin policy’ rationale of the dominant governmental
rationality in neoliberal times: through physical and professional training projects
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enhancing NY’s human capital (Bloomberg’s Roosvelt Island project and de Blasio’s Tech
Talent initiative), through web-based communicative initiatives (de Blasio’s Digital NYC
project) and through fiscal incentives to start-up firms (governor Cuomo’s ‘Start-up NY’
policy). The role of government leaders is therefore different from that played by their
predecessors in the late 1990s (limited to entertaining good relationships with real estate
investors at a time of exceptionally high vacancy rate even in global cities like New York) but
also by the governments in the ‘late Keynesian era’ (normatively designing technopoles and
related economic spaces). Their purpose is rather to generate a governmental rationality
creating conditions for the exploitation of the city’s cognitive capital and aiming at the
entrepreneurialization of society and the self. While in the late 1980s, David Harvey
identified the ‘entrepreneurialization of urban governance’ as the distinctive trait of post-
Keynesian, neoliberal societies (Harvey, 1989), based on his previous theorization of the
second circuit of capital (Harvey, 1978), today’s post-recession societies are witnessing an
expansion in the process of entrepreneurialization, involving society as a whole and the self,
as envisaged by Michel Foucault in his pioneering diagnosis of neoliberal governmentality
(Foucault, 2008).
Rio de Janeiro: Becoming a start-up city
During the last three decades, New York City and Rio de Janeiro show parallel trajectories
of urban decline and regeneration. During the 1990s, like New York, Rio de Janeiro sought
to recover from a long cycle of relative decline, in this case associated with the city’s loss of
national capital status in 1960 and the consequent fall in public investment. Economic
decline culminated with the recession of the 1980s which affected the Brazilian economy.
At that time, a significant number of Rio’s leading banks, industries, and research and
development companies either relocated or moved their headquarters to Sa˜o Paulo
(Tolosa, 1996). The 1990s were therefore marked by the embrace of a number of policy
initiatives mostly oriented towards the enhancement of social cohesion, economic
revitalization and industrial specialization. In this context, federal, state, and local
authorities supported the genesis, development and networking of scientific institutions
and technology-based activities, leading the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro to
acquire a reputation as an emerging ‘techno-pole’ in the fields of energy, environment and
ICTs, with an innovation system integrally linked to, and in large part built upon, its natural
and environmental resources, endowments and assets (Botelho et al., 2010; De Mello and
Rocha, 2004).
The second half of the 2000s saw a renewed entrepreneurialism by the federal state, using
public spending as a catalyst for urban and economic growth. At this time, with the election
of Sergio Cabral as governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro (2006), and of Eduardo Paes as
mayor of Rio de Janeiro (2008), both members of the centre-right Brazilian Democratic
Movement Party (PMDB), a party allied with the ruling left-leaning Workers party (PT) at
the federal level, Rio benefitted from significant financial and political support from all the
three tiers of government. After obtaining the designation of both the 2014 Football World
Cup and the 2016 Olympics Games, the three tiers of government, despite their conflicts,
have mobilized closely related narratives about Rio’s transformation into a city-business
laboratory model (Gaffney, 2014). In this phase, Rio came to symbolize the ‘Cariocas
miracle’ (De Queiroz Ribeiro and Olinger, 2014), legitimizing the inclusion of Brazil into
the exclusive circle of BRIC countries from the early 2000s onwards.
This hegemonic project, held together by pragmatic alliances and a transversal policy
narrative incorporating both neo-developmentalist and neoliberal policies (Richmond and
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Garmany, 2016), has taken form in concomitance with the global financial crisis, which only
mildly touched Brazil, whereas in previous years its fast-growing economy had created a
fertile ground for digital media and e-commerce markets. This effervescence attracted
foreign investors, private equity funds and bankers, giving rise to a boom in technology
start-ups in Brazil. At this stage, Brazil, as other emerging economies, was particularly
characterized by the phenomenon of local start-ups imitating or even cloning successful
US Internet-based companies. The success of Internet startups such as Peixe Urbano
(clone of Groupon) and Dafiti (clone of Amazon) thus marked the beginning of a
worldwide interest for cariocan startups (Irrera, 2012).
In spite of the euphoria accompanying copycats’ escalation, the increasing awareness of
the limits of this phenomenon highlighted the necessity to go beyond the replication of the
most successful Silicon Valley’s business models. In a politico-economic context affected by a
precipitous economic slowdown from 2011 onwards and by the eruption of social discontent
and corruption scandals, a campaign around start-up urbanism has been launched by
Brazilian elites on both sides of the political spectrum.
Since 2010, mass-media have started emphasizing the need for bipartisan consensus over
technology innovation in Brazil. Echoing the criticism raised by The Economist with respect to
the Brazilian model of innovation (The Economist, 2010), an editorial of the O’Globo argued:
The country should consider the key contribution of multinational companies based here,
especially those that have a vision, like IBM, that innovation is no longer restricted to R&D
labs of large companies or universities, but it may occur even in the slums. Through partnerships
with these companies, we can not only channel Brazilian innovations in the global market, but
also increase indigenous innovation. (O’Globo, 2011; our translation)
The construction of a ‘durable and mature innovative ecosystem’ (Exame, 2012) is now
premised on a bottom-up mobilization of a ‘new generation of connected and integrated’
technology entrepreneurs, ‘able to share knowledge, kindness, education, solidarity, justice
and ethics’ (Exame, 2013). This conception entails a shift from a hierarchical, ‘late
Keynesian’ and/or neo-developmentalist policy of innovation, conventionally focused on
extractive industry and natural resources, to self-propulsive startup economies being able
to leverage the ‘cognitive capital’ of urban environments.
In the emerging approach to technology-oriented economic policy, the main role of
governments is to deal with contextual factors such as ‘bureaucracy’, ‘education’, ‘social
inequality’, ‘property rights’ (O’Globo, 2011) as well as ‘technological infrastructures’
(O’Globo, 2013a), in order to create a knowledge-intensive, business-friendly
environment, while, the ‘innovation ecosystem’ is said to be ‘not dependent on official
actions’, in so far as ‘the entrepreneurialism fostered by the government, though laudable,
has a stimulus function, but it doesn’t last long’ (Exame, 2014: 51).
The federal state has gradually adopted this new powerful start-up city discourse as an
imperative for Brazil’s transition towards a knowledge economy-based society. In doing so,
it has incorporated the new policy rationale into its neo-developmentalist agenda by
launching in 2012 ‘Startup Up Brazil’ as part of the larger initiative ‘Brazil Strategic
Planning for Software and IT services’. Initially, through the Startup Brazil initiative, the
government hired a number of consultants looking at what leading countries in the high-tech
sector, such as the US, Israel and South Korea, were doing in order to foster innovation, as
well as identifying structural weaknesses within Brazil’s tech ecosystem. At a later stage, the
initiative has focused on the creation of public–private partnerships taking the lead in nine
accelerator programs, five of which based in the city of Rio, offering consulting, financial
and logistical support to early-stage tech firms (http://startupbrasil.org.br/).
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In a general context marked by the preparation for the 2016 Olympics, Rio has become
the largest beneficiary of the Brazilian start-up initiative, as the city boasts a unique
concentration of public and private economic actors and institutions: the most
competitive universities in technology and applied sciences; major government-owned
corporations (such as Petrobras) and funding entities, such as FINEP (a governmental
company incentivizing business in technology, science and innovation) and the national
development bank (BNDES), along with a number of multinational corporations.
The state of Rio de Janeiro has joined the federal initiative, by launching in 2013 a
‘Startup Rio’ project, under the responsibility of the Rio’s Association of Brazilian
Technology Companies (Assepro-Rio). As Gustavo Tutuca, the Science and Technology
Secretary of State, points out: this project has been conceived as an ‘ignition point, a
stage prior to acceleration’ (O’Globo, 2013b), with the aim of giving financial, educational
and logistic support to 150 startup companies. According to the O’Globo, this institutional
endeavour will ‘stimulate startup entrepreneurial ecosystem’ and ‘investments in new
business models based on digital technological innovations’, competing locally, regionally
and globally for the attraction of talent, ideas and technology (O’Globo, 2015b).
The rise of this new powerful discourse within the mainstream media and the public-
policy sphere is reflected in the emergence of a vibrant startup scene, which includes a variety
of actors and interests involved (businesses, governments, universities, banks, NGOs, media,
local communities). A growing number of digital start-ups have thus appeared in Rio.
According to the latest data released by the Brazilian Association of Startups (in late
2015), Rio de Janeiro has 335 startups, specializing in mobility devices, e-commerce, big
data, social media, cloud, games and apps. These early-stage firms tend to form micro-
clusters gravitating around private incubators and accelerators, mostly localized in the
central city, as well as in its western part, the Barra de Tijuca neighbourhood and the
southern area of the city, across the Botafogo, Flamengo and Copacabana districts.
Far from being a process triggered by a self-organized community of techno-bohemians,
as in the New York case, the ‘flourishing and professionalizing RJ startup ecosystem’
(O’Globo, 2012a) has initially taken shape mainly as the outcome of a state-led
entrepreneurialist strategy capitalizing on the work of local pioneers, such as the ‘21212’
digital accelerator founded in 2011 (see O’Globo, 2012b, 2012c): an accelerator dedicated to
start-up entrepreneurs with explicit ties to New York (Rio’s code phone is 21, New York’s is
212, hence the 21212 name). On the one side, public investments and related initiatives, such
as Startup Brazil and Startup Rio, have enabled federal and state governments to take the
lead in partnership-building processes involving investors, tech start-ups and digital
professionals. In February 2015, for instance, FINEP has announced its intention to
invest 450 million dollars in technological start-ups over the next three years within the
framework of the ‘Inova startup’ programme. The project is aimed at aiding ‘two
thousand small technology companies needing a financial boost to flourish’, particularly
by removing ‘legal impediments to investment funds’ (Valor Econoˆmico, 2015a).
On the other side, the growing integration of the city into the flows of policy knowledge in
the high-tech sector has paved the way for a more proactive strategy of urban
entrepreneurialism, city branding and the attraction of high-tech corporations. An
increasing number of powerful high-tech corporations have established their presence in
Rio. Intel has created a technology centre, doing research on the ‘internet of things’, big
data and high performance computing; Cisco Systems plans to create a $500m innovation
centre which includes a venture-capital fund and the co-development of new technologies;
Microsoft has announced the opening in the waterfront area of its first advanced technology
centre in Brazil, which will act also as a business incubator for local start-ups. This presence
1012 Environment and Planning A 49(5)
induces local elites to embark on strategies of global competitiveness in the high-tech sector.
According to the President of Rio Nego´cios, Marcelo Haddad, the IT port’s project aims ‘to
connect Rio to other cities with digital hubs in the world, such as New York, Berlin and
London’ (O’Globo, 2012d).
Both state and corporate-led initiatives have taken shape in a context characterized by the
circulation of increasingly pervasive pro-startup discourses and imaginaries, fostered by
regular networking events, such as Startup Weekend and Startup Digest, which have
pushed towards Rio’s integration within the worldwide network of high-tech startups,
while new platforms, such as ‘Circuito StartUp Rio’ and ‘Startup Rio Meetup’ (O’Globo,
2012e), along with a growing number of ‘co-working spaces, mentors and funding agents’,
have disseminated ideas emphasizing the need to strengthen the local ecosystem and to foster
its ‘collaborative economy’ (O’Globo, 2014).
Reflecting the emerging self-propulsive nature of startup urbanism in Rio, the idea of the
so-called ‘Brazil’s silicon beach’ has mobilized a multifaceted landscape of grassroots
engagement involving advocacy groups, civic mapping exercises, citizen journalism and
citizen science (Watts, 2014). These organizations, mostly financed through online
fundraising campaign and crowd-funding platforms, are said to lay the foundations for
economic growth, social innovation and ‘democratic participation’. In this context, a host
of digital startups have emerged with a specific focus on Rio’s slums (the favelas), such as
Barrio Chic, which acts as a ‘dialogue platform’ between entrepreneurs and city dwellers;
Tunnel Lab, a tech startup accelerator hub whose mission is to empower low-income young
people living in the slums, through access to technology and entrepreneurship.
The emphasis on the favelas’ innovation potential has become a distinguishing trait of the
startup movement in Rio. Over the last years, the Brazilian NGO ‘Comiteˆ para a
Democratizac¸a˜o da Informa´tica’, under government sponsorship, in collaboration with
global corporations, such as Google and Microsoft, and business platforms, such as
Impact Hub and the World Entrepreneurship Forum, has launched the ‘Rio Favela
Startup Weekend’ and ‘Startup Weekend Change Makers’. This process has been
described as a ‘huge movement towards entrepreneurial synapses’ (O’Globo, 2015), as it
aims at establishing collaborative relations between slum dwellers and startup
communities, finding solutions to the social problems affecting Morro da Providencia
and Pava˜o-Pava˜ozinho, the areas being identified as ‘pilot favelas’ (www.riofavela.
startupweekend.org/).
Through a combination of neoliberal and neo-developmentalist approaches and of
grassroots innovation, the embrace of a ‘sustainable startup movement’ narrative and the
dissemination of the related high-tech ‘animating fantasies’ have enabled the Rio startup
ecosystem to incorporate the favelas into the ‘circle of innovation’, as recommended by
The Economist in 2010, and, in doing so, to be admitted into a ‘global space of business
models [. . .] that is not yet occupied’ (Valor Econoˆmico, 2015b). The apparent
emotional engagement of the startup community with the social problems of the favelas
mobilizes the slum as a socio-technical ecology (see McFarlane, 2012; Roy, 2011), as a key
source of ‘general intellect’ and knowledge extraction, through the incorporation of its
alleged ‘potential for innovation’ within the capitalist circuit of valorization. By
exploiting this potential, according to a recent report released by Silicon Beach VCs
(2014), Rio will be able to reposition itself not only as the main rival of the most
competitive urban startup ecosystems in Latin America, such as those of Sa˜o Paulo and
Santiago (Compass, 2015), but also as an emerging global hub of policy knowledge and
technological experimentation in the fields of digital technology, life sciences, poverty
alleviation and social innovation.
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Conclusion
Drawing on the insights of Marxist-Foucauldian interpreters of knowledge-intensive
capitalism within contemporary neoliberal societies, this article has explored the
phenomenon of global urbanization of technology-based economies, looking at a self-
proclaimed ‘model tech city’ (New York) and an emerging start-up city (Rio de Janeiro).
The main findings of this article have been the following: firstly, our work has scrutinized the
qualitative differences between the so-called late-Keynesian projects of technopoles in the
1980s and the 1990s and the current city-based high tech boom in the globalizing world.
The former were illustrative of a pattern of hierarchically organized regional development
policy, while the latter are expression of a neoliberal governmental rationality pursuing an
idea of global ‘enterprise society’ through an entrepreneurialization of the self. The
neoliberal governmental rationality shapes, and is shaped by, discourses, imaginaries and
fantasies constructed around notions of self-organization and cooperation. In this context,
politico-economic elites have become increasingly cognizant of the ‘cognitive-communicative
capital’ that cities have to offer to capitalist economies, particularly in a context of post-
recession as in the case of New York and of economic slowdown and socio-political tensions
in that of Rio.
Secondly, the comparative exercise undertaken in this article has showed the variegated,
place-specific character of the process of global urbanization. Rather than identifying a
homogenous global start-up city, the analysis of the two trajectories of start-up urbanism
brings to light the specificities of local context in the presence of a global logic of economic
development. On the one hand, ‘northern elites’ turn high-tech fantasies based on ideals of
collaboration and cooperation into strategies of competitive urbanism, as demonstrated by
New York’s global leadership aspirations within the start-up phenomenon and by Rio’s
reproduction of the same model. On the other hand, in travelling to the South, the tech
city model and the related governmental rationality of the ‘entrepreneur of the self’
represented by New York has hybridized with the developmentalist imperative in Brazil,
which particularly concentrates on the favelas as sites for the extraction of cognitive-
communicative capital.
In more general terms, the proposed case studies provide instructive lessons concerning
our understanding of global urbanization and urbanism. The relentless expansion of the start-
up model of tech urbanism shows how the maximization of knowledge creation and
technological innovation has become strictly dependent on processes of ‘societal
subsumption’ to which urban societies have much to offer. Due to their unique
concentration of relational and affective resources as well as communicative networks, the
leading cities of both the North and the South of the world act at one and the same time as key
sites for the realization of the neoliberal ideal of the ‘entrepreneur of the self’ and as crucial
sources of knowledge extraction and production. Put it shortly, cities and particularly the
major metropolitan centres acting as engines of national economies have become the social
factories of global capitalism. In the final analysis, this phenomenon demands critical urban
scholars paying stronger attention to the affirmative power of cognitive-communicative
capitalism, in terms of production of a subjectivity forged by entrepreneurial forms of
life, as the driving force behind today’s global urbanization and urbanism.
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